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This paper seeks a consistent view of the baseline for the protection of 
goodwill under the English law of passing off1 across diverse applications 
within its jurisdiction.  In cases involving presale advertising which 
introduces the advertised goods to the marketplace, the law has shown a 
potential for protecting goodwill before any sale occurs and thus before any 
customer base is established.  In cases involving professional and trade 
governing and promoting bodies and charities, the law has long protected 
the goodwill of claimants which may not have a trade customer base.  
However, while it is not disputed that traders need to have goodwill within a 
jurisdiction before the law of passing off would protect their goodwill there, 
traders whose goods and/or services (collectively “goods”) may be known in 
England or Wales, but who operate no business there, must have a customer 
base there to establish goodwill (often called “extraterritorial goodwill”) 
within the jurisdiction.  A 2015 UK Supreme Court decision affirms this 
stance.2  It has not proven uncontroversial.3  The problem is considered one 
of the most intractable in the law of passing off.4  The Supreme Court notes 
it is “of particularly acute significance in the age of global electronic 
                                                          
*Senior Lecturer, University of Aberdeen.  This work has benefited enormously from the 
comments of H. Carty, A. Fenwick, L.T.C. Harms, M. Silverleaf, D. Vaver and the L.Q.R. 
referee on their review of earlier drafts.  All views expressed (unless specified otherwise) 
here and all infelicities are mine alone.  
1 For the purpose of the law of passing off, the UK comprises of three jurisdictions:  England 
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland; see also Metric Resources Corporation v 
Leasemetrix Ltd. [1979] F.S.R. 571 (Ch) at 575.  This paper focuses on the law of England 
and Wales.  It refers to the ‘UK’ where the case under discussion uses that term. 
2 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. v British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc [2015] UKSC 31; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 
2628. 
3 See for example:  David Brophy, “The Supreme Court Decision in Starbucks (HK) v British 
Sky Broadcasting:  is that crazy horse still running?” (2015) E.I.P.R. 661; Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok, 
“Protection of a Reputable Foreign Trader’s Legitimate Interests under the Law of Passing-
off” (2016) 132 L.Q.R. 186; Olivia Gray and John Colbourn, “Supreme Court Re-Affirms 
Requirement of Goodwill in the Jurisdiction” (2016) 11 J.I.P.L.P. 280. 
4 Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off:  unfair competition by misrepresentation, 5th 
edn (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at [3-082].  
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communication.”5  Arguably, global electronic communication and easy low-
cost global travel make the case all the more compelling for not requiring a 
customer base within a jurisdiction before goodwill is protected there.   
 
This paper asserts that the law ought to be consistent in protecting a 
claimant’s goodwill where the relevant public in a jurisdiction would, upon 
seeing the claimant’s distinctive identifiers – typically trade marks, or upon 
seeing marks identical or similar to the claimant’s, recognise and attribute 
the underlying goods as being connected with or having been endorsed or 
licensed by the claimant.  Unlike scholarly works which draw on other 
common law jurisdictions in analysing extraterritorial goodwill cases,6 this 
paper considers the English law of passing off within the various contexts of 
its domestic applications.  It will contribute to the current discussions 
concerning the protection of extraterritorial goodwill under the law of 
passing off in three ways:  First, it delineates between what constitutes 
goodwill and what may evidence goodwill - having a customer base within a 
jurisdiction may, but does not always, evidence the presence of goodwill 
there.  This work sees the presence of goodwill as a condition in the 
marketplace which may spread without regard to jurisdictional boundaries, 
and importantly without attributing this spread to the conduct of the 
disputing parties.  Second, this work will show through an examination of 
oft-cited case law that until recently, courts have viewed the presence of 
customers within the relevant jurisdiction as part of the overall supporting 
evidence for the presence of goodwill.  Recent decisions however have 
viewed the presence or absence of customers within the jurisdiction as 
determinative of the presence or absence of goodwill there.  Finally, this 
work will challenge the perceived dichotomy between “goodwill” which is 
protected under the law of passing off, and “mere reputation” which is said 
                                                          
5 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [1]. 
6 For example:  Frederick W. Mostert, “Is Goodwill Territorial or International?  Protection of a 
famous trade mark which has not been used in the local jurisdiction” (1989) 11 (12) E.I.P.R. 
440; Fiona Martin, “The Dividing Line between Goodwill and International Reputation:  a 
comparison of the law relating to passing off in the United Kingdom, Australia and other 
jurisdictions” [1995] Journal of Business Law 70; Po Jen Yap, “Foreign Traders and Goodwill 
Hunting:  passed over or passing off?” (2009) 31(9) E.I.P.R. 448; Cheng Lim Saw, “Goodwill 
Hunting in Passing Off:  time to jettison the strict ‘hard line’ approach in England?” (2010) 8 
Journal of Business Law 645; Arpan Banerjee, “Spill-Over Reputation in Passing Off Actions:  
Indian and English law compared” (2014) 14 O.U.C.L.J. 21. 
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not to be so protected.  Reputation in the broad sense is beyond the remit of 
the law of passing off.  However, the cases dealing with professional and 
trade governing and promoting bodies and charities which may have no 
trade customers and the recent judicial consideration of presale advertising 
(undertaken before goods are first marketed and custom garnered) suggest 
that the law may protect reputation that is publicly perceived as having been 
engendered through the claimants’ advertising or public communication, 
merchandising, or sale of goods.  Where such communication, 
merchandising, or sale takes place, and how such reputation is spread into a 
jurisdiction ought not be at issue in inquiring if goodwill exists there.    
   
This work does not consider residual goodwill which remains after business 
operation ceases because the key obstacle in establishing a consistent 
baseline to protect goodwill lies in whether or not goodwill may be 
engendered without prior sales.  While Trade Marks Act 1994 also protects 
registered trade marks from certain third party uses within the UK of 
identical or similar marks,7 and protects well-known trade marks pursuant 
to the terms of the Paris Convention,8 it does not affect the law relating to 
passing off.9  The legislation protects trade marks as “property”;10 the law of 
passing off remains significant in protecting the goodwill of registered, 
unregistered and unregistrable marks and indicia.11     
 
I. Delineating What Constitutes Goodwill from What May Evidence 
Goodwill  
 
This part seeks to delineate between what constitutes goodwill and what 
may evidence goodwill.  Goodwill as a legal concept has its roots in the 
marketplace.12  In assessing goodwill, courts should view it within the 
                                                          
7 Trade Marks Act 1994 s. 10(1) – (3). 
8 Trade Marks Act 1994 s. 56; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 
March 20th 1883 art. 6bis. 
9 Trade Marks Act 1994 s. 2(2); Olivia Gray and John Colbourn, “Supreme Court Re-Affirms 
Requirement of Goodwill in the Jurisdiction” (2016) 11 J.I.P.L.P 280.  
10 Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 2(1). 
11 Mairie Ni Shuilleabhain, “Common-Law Protection of Trade Marks – the continuing 
relevance of passing off” (2003) 34(7) I.I.C. 722.  
12 I.R.C. v Muller & Co.’s Margarine, Limited [1901] A.C. 217 (HL) at 223 (Macnaghten L.J.), at 
231 – 232 (Brampton L.J.). 
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context of the marketplace.13  The objective of the law is to protect goodwill 
from harm that results from a particular type of misrepresentation.  The law 
has come to define “goodwill” in terms familiar to its marketplace roots, and 
accord certain protection to it.  In copyright terms, this process is analogous 
to first defining “artistic works” (rather than “copyright”14) as a subject matter 
for protection under UK copyright legislation15.  Such artistic works then 
attract certain protection16 as specified later in the legislation.  In passing off 
terms, how goodwill is defined and what protection it attracts are two 
separate matters which require separate analysis.  This work focuses on how 
goodwill is defined and how it may be evidenced. 
 
A. Goodwill in the Marketplace 
 
First, it is important to appreciate the role of goodwill in the marketplace.  
Goodwill is brand recognition which may affect trading relationships.  It is 
distinct from reputation in the broad sense because goodwill is engendered 
through public encounters with the brand’s approved goods, merchandising, 
and public communication.  Such brand recognition is not limited by 
jurisdictional boundaries.  It can also be engendered and spread through 
advertising directed or spilt-over from abroad, or by customers travelling 
from aboard after having been exposed there to the branded goods.  Travel 
and communication networks are conduits for the spread of brand 
recognition, whether or not intended by the brand owner.  Recent 
developments toward broadening worldwide web and social media use and 
toward easy low-cost travel further facilitate the recognition of domestic 
brands abroad, and of foreign brands domestically.  Traders wish to guard 
against others posing under their guise, others who would use their 
distinguishing marks to divert consumer demand and diffuse the traders’ 
command of the market among consumers and prospective consumers.   
 
                                                          
13 For example:  Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed [2001] EWHC 440 at [23], [24]; Fenty v 
Arcadia Group Brands Limited [2015] EWCA 3 at [49]; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3291. 
14 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [59], citing Christopher Wadlow, The Law of 
Passing-Off:  unfair competition by misrepresentation, 4th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011) at [3-131]; Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off:  unfair competition by 
misrepresentation, 5th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at [3-84].   
15 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 4. 
16 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 1. 
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Traders may extend their brand reach by licensing their distinguishing mark 
for others’ use in diverse regional zones, or trade sectors, or in 
endorsements or merchandising where spin-off items (such as T-shirts 
bearing the image of pop star Rihanna) are sold to promote primary goods 
(such as Rihanna’s live concerts and music videos).  Where consumers are 
aware of these branding practices, they may expect the practices to be 
generated or approved by the brand.   
 
Furthermore, conspicuous public consumption of branded goods can also 
create demand for the brand, especially when the perceived consumers are 
celebrities and role models within a target market.  Thus brand promotion 
and dissemination are not necessarily undertaken by the brand owner alone, 
but are often aided by other consumers in the marketplace.  If seeing others 
in the community use branded goods can create demand, then seeing others 
(such as 007/JAMES BOND) favourably use branded goods (such as OMEGA 
watches17) through product placement in a (JAMES BOND) movie may also 
create consumer demand.  Product placement can promote goods.  When 
movies are exported or accessed abroad, audiences there are exposed to the 
branded goods strategically placed for their perceived use by celebrity users.  
Thus the sale of a trader’s goods (in this example, JAMES BOND movies) may 
extend another’s brand recognition and create consumer demand (of OMEGA 
watches) within the scripted contexts embedded in the primary goods.  
Goods and advertising are thus consumed through the same medium – 
where consumer demand for the primary goods may be met and refreshed 
through direct consumption, that for the promoted goods may be created 
through perceived consumption.  Both may affect trade in the primary and 
the promoted goods.    
 
B. Goodwill as a Legal Concept 
 
Under the current law, goodwill is the first of three elements which 
constitute the English tort against a trader passing off his/her goods as 
                                                          
17 See Omega SA, “The Perfect Watch for World’s Most Beloved Spy” 
https://www.omegawatches.com/planet-omega/cinema/james-bond/ accessed 29 May 
2017; also Chris Hackley and Rungpaka Tiwsakul, “Entertainment Marketing and Experiential 
Consumption” (2006) 12:1 Journal of Marketing Communications 63; Vildan Jusufovic 
Karisik, “20 Years of Research on Product Placement in Movie, Television and Video Game 
Media” (2014) 4 Journal of Economic and Social Studies 253. 
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those of another’s.  These elements as set out by Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in 
Reckitt and Colman Products Limited v Borden Inc.18 are commonly applied 
to the law of passing off as a whole, including extraterritorial goodwill 
cases19 and false advertising and merchandising cases.20  The three-part test 
captures the essence of the law of passing off with greater precision21 than 
the tests proposed earlier in Erven Warnink B.V. v J. Townend & Sons (Hull) 
Ltd.22 which are applied in some of the extraterritorial goodwill cases23 and 
the presale advertising cases analysed here24 (they predate Reckitt and 
Colman Products Limited).   
                                                          
18 Reckitt and Colman Products Limited v Borden Inc. [1990] UKHL 12; [1990] W.L.R. 491.  
19 Pete Waterman Ltd. v C.B.S. United Kingdom Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) – although the 
case only cites Reckitt and Colman Products Limited [1990] W.L.R. 491(HL) for the issue of 
distinctiveness, it follows the three-part test model set out in Reckitt and Colman Products 
Limited [1990] W.L.R. 491(HL) at 499; Starbucks (HK) Ltd [2015] UKSC 31 at [15] – [17], [60]. 
20 Hearst Holdings Inc. v A.V.E.L.A. Inc. [2014] EWHC 439 at [65]; [2014] All E.R. (D) 220 
(Feb) – referring to both Reckitt and Colman Products Limited [1990] W.L.R. 491(HL) and 
Erven Warnink B.V. v J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [1979] A.C. 731; [1979] 2 All E.R. 927 
(HL); Fenty [2015] EWCA 3 at [33]. 
21 See Lord Diplock noting the logical fallacy in his own test at Erven Warnink B.V. [1979] 
A.C. 731 (HL) at 742; David Vaver, “’Brand Culture:  trade marks, marketing and 
consumption’ – responding legally to Professor Schroeder’s paper’” in Jennifer Davis, Lionel 
Bently, Jane C. Ginsburg (eds.), Trade Marks and Brands – an interdisciplinary critique, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 181, 192; Hazel Carty, “Passing Off:  
frameworks of liability debated” [2012] I.P.Q. 106. 
22 Erven Warnink B.V. [1979] A.C. 731 (HL) in particular at 742 (Diplock L.J.), at 755 – 756 
(Fraser of Tullybelton L.J.). 
23 The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. v Cobra Sports Ltd. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 
356 – which emphasises the “territorial position” in Lord Fraser’s test even though 
extraterritorial goodwill was not at issue in Erven Warnink B.V. [1979] A.C. 731 (HL) – see My 
Kinda Bones Limited v Dr. Pepper’s Stove Co. Ltd. [1984] F.S.R. 289 (Ch) at 298 on this 
point; Home Box Office Inc. v Channel 5 Home Box Office Ltd. [1982] F.S.R. 449 (Ch) at 455 
– which applies Lord Diplock’s test while acknowledging the “territorial position” in Lord 
Fraser’s test; Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Budejovicky Budvar N.P. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 462 – 
463 (Oliver L.J.) – who found Lord Diplock’s and Lord Fraser’s tests complement each other,  
at 471 (O’Connor L.J.) – who also relied on their tests; (1984) 81 L.S.G. 1369; Pete Waterman 
Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 55 – which cites Lord Fraser’s fourth requirement that 
plaintiffs have goodwill in England, but not his first requirement that the plaintiffs’ business 
consists of or includes selling in England; Jian Tools for Sales Inc. v Roderick Manhattan 
Group Limited [1995] F.S.R. 924 (Ch) at 935. 
24 B.B.C. v Talbot Motor Company Ltd. [1981] F.S.R. 228 (Ch) at 232 – 234; My Kinda Bones 
Limited [1984] F.S.R. 289 (Ch) at 297, 299; Marcus Publishing Plc v Hutton-Wild 
Communications Limited [1990] R.P.C. 576 (CA) at 579; Times 31 October, 1989. 
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Significantly, the recent Supreme Court decision dealing with extraterritorial 
goodwill applies the test from Reckitt and Colman Products Limited.25  The 
three elements of the tort set there are:26  First, goodwill which arises from 
an association of the claimant’s goods with the claimant’s distinctive 
identifier (such as a trade mark or logo) in the public’s mind such that the 
public would recognise the claimant’s goods by the identifier; second, a 
misrepresentation (whether or not intentional) by the defendant to the public 
which would lead or likely lead the public to believe that the defendant’s 
goods are those of the claimant’s; and finally, damage or likelihood of 
damage to the claimant’s goodwill from the erroneous belief that would or 
likely result from the defendant’s misrepresentation.  While a trader must 
have goodwill within a jurisdiction before the law of passing off can protect 
it there, the protection conferred is further limited under the second and 
third elements of the tort:  the law protects only against the specified type of 
misrepresentation and the likelihood of harm to goodwill caused thereby.  
All three elements together constitute the tort.  All three play a role in 
setting boundaries for the tort.27   
 
This work focuses on analysing the first element of goodwill, namely how it 
is defined as the subject matter of protection, and how this subject matter 
may be evidenced by facts which fit within the definition.     
 
The law of passing off is said to protect goodwill,28 the first element of the 
tort set out by Lord Oliver in Reckitt and Colman Products Limited.  Goodwill 
is broadly accepted within the law of passing off as “the benefit and 
                                                          
25 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [15] – [17], [60]; note that [23] – [24], [56] also 
briefly cites Erven Warnink B.V. [1979] A.C. 731 (HL). 
26 Reckitt and Colman Products Limited [1990] W.L.R. 491(HL) at 499. 
27 Working in concert, the three elements of the tort avoid the issue within trade mark 
legislation which grants absolute protection to marks when an identical sign is used in 
relation to identical goods – see for example Annette Kur, “Trade Marks Function, Don’t 
They?  CJEU jurisprudence and unfair competition principles” (2014) 45(4) I.I.C. 434; Martin 
R.F. Senftleben et al, “The Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Freedom of 
Expression and Undistorted Competition:  guiding principles for the further development of 
EU trade mark law” (2015) 37(6) E.I.P.R. 337.  
28 A.G. Spalding Bros. v A.W. Gamage Ltd. [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 147; 32 R.P.C. 273 (HL) at 
284 as cited in Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [21]; Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands 
Limited [2013] EWHC 2310 at [31]; [2014] F.S.R. 5. 
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advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a business … the 
attractive force which brings in custom”29 as set out in the tax case of Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co.’s Margarine Ltd. (“I.R.C.”).  If this 
force exists within a jurisdiction in a way prescribed under the law of passing 
off, the law there should protect it without requiring more.  The public need 
not know the claimant’s goods by name.30  Where a sufficient portion of the 
relevant public within a jurisdiction sees a claimant’s mark or a mark 
identical or similar to the claimant’s, and recognises the underlying goods as 
the claimant’s or as connected with, or endorsed or licensed by the claimant, 
such brand recognition should be indicative of the claimant’s goodwill there.  
Confusion which may arise with another’s mark may also be indicative of a 
presence of goodwill because no confusion in the minds of the relevant 
public would be possible without brand recognition as a point of reference.  
Such confusion alone however does not constitute misrepresentation for the 
second element of the tort as will be discussed later.   
 
By the description in I.R.C., goodwill must pre-exist custom in order to 
attract custom.  It may exist whether or not custom results.  Arguably 
presale advertising aims to engender goodwill to attract custom.  If goodwill 
is founded only upon customer presence, then the law of passing off would 
only protect repeat purchases.  However, even in passing off cases which 
declare “advertising without trade is nothing”, the law protects goodwill 
within a locality rather than merely among pre-existing customers.31  It does 
                                                          
29 I.R.C. [1901] A.C. 217 (HL) at 223 – 224 (Macnaghten L.J.). 
30 The Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Company, Limited v Powell [1897] A.C. 710 (HL) at 712 
– 716. 
31 Cruttwell v Lye (1810) 17 Ves. 335; 34 E.R. 129 defines goodwill as “nothing more than 
the probability that old customers will resort to the old place”; cf Trego v Hunt [1896] A.C. 7 
(HL) at 23 – 25; 65 L.J. Ch. 1; S. Chivers & Sons v Chivers & Co., Ld. (1900) 17 R.P.C. 420 
(HCJ ChD) 431 – which deals with the acquisition of secondary meaning; see also for 
example:  Faulder & Co. Ld. v O. and G. Rushton, Ld. (1903) 20 R.P.C. 477 (CA) at 492 – 
496; 19 T.L.R. 452; Brestian v Try [1958] R.P.C. 161 (CA) at 173; The Athletes Foot 
Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 350; Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 
413 (CA) at 464 – 465, 467 – 470 (Oliver L.J.), at 476 (Dillon L.J.) – who considered “ordinary 
members of the public” in England as “customers”, at 471 – 472 (O’Connor L.J.) – who 
considered “American servicemen [to whom the plaintiffs’ beer were made available] are 
members of the public in this country like any other visitor”; see also Ian Tregoning, “Lord 
Eldon’s Goodwill” (2004) 15 K.C.L.J. 93.  
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not require claimants to trade within the locality comprehensively.32  Brand 
recognition may influence purchase decisions among prospective customers 
there.  
                                              
On the other hand, trade may not necessarily engender goodwill.33  
Purchases are often made out of convenience or necessity without any 
attention as to whom the sale may be attributed.  Last minute gift and 
souvenir vendors at airports may have international customers, but not 
international goodwill.  Presented with the airport vendors’ trade marks, 
customers abroad may not recognise the vendors at all.   
 
Thus, having goodwill and having customers are separate matters.  Having 
goodwill does not necessarily indicate a presence of customers.  While 
having customers may support a presence of goodwill, having customers 
alone does not necessarily indicate a presence of goodwill.  The mere 
coexistence of a trader’s mark and a trader’s customers within a jurisdiction 
would not suffice.  To evidence goodwill, such customers or prospective 
customers must make decisions – whether or not immediately realisable, 
based on their brand recognition.  This requirement of a reliance on brand 
recognition in purchase decision making limits the protection of the goodwill 
to that sufficiently pertinent and potent to draw in customers, to affect trade.   
The causal link between the defendant’s misrepresentation (second element 
of the tort) and the potential resulting harm (third element) to the claimant’s 
goodwill (first element) further limits the tort.  All three elements under 
Reckitt and Colman Products Limited act in concert to complete the tort and 
limit its reach.   This full analysis ought not be cut short by an additional 
requirement of a customer base to the initial element of goodwill.     
  
C. Delineating What Constitutes Goodwill from What May Evidence 
Goodwill in Extraterritorial Goodwill Cases 
                                                          
32 Faulder & Co. Ld. (1903) 20 R.P.C. 477 (CA) at 492 – 494; Ewing v Buttercup Margarine 
Company, Limited [1917] 2 Ch. 1 (CA) at 13; [1916-1917] All E.R. 1012; Brestian [1958] 
R.P.C. 161 (CA) at 170; Maxim’s Limited v Dye [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1155; [1977] F.S.R. 364 (Ch) 
at 370; Chelsea Man Menswear Limited v Chelsea Girl Limited [1987] R.P.C. 189 (CA) at 202 
– 208; David Rose, “Season of Goodwill:  passing off and overseas traders” (1996) 18(6) 
E.I.P.R. 356 at 369. 
33 Po Jen Yap, “Foreign Traders and Goodwill Hunting:  passed over or passing off?” (2009) 
31(9) E.I.P.R. 448 at 450. 
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Having customers may appear a more tangible way to evidence the presence 
of an “attractive force which brings in custom” than to show goodwill as a 
form of reputation that exists in the mind of the relevant public as 
formulated in Reckitt and Colman Products Limited.  Among extraterritorial 
goodwill cases, two further reasons may account for the customer base 
requirement.  First, the relevant goods are readily available albeit outside the 
relevant jurisdiction.  It is therefore tempting to demand that goodwill be 
established by the presence of customers within the jurisdiction.34  This 
would prevent brand owners from claiming goodwill to be protected in a 
jurisdiction merely by sending advertisements there or enjoying a reputation 
spilt-over from elsewhere without doing more, as some courts appear keen 
to avoid.35  In an age where advertising often appears on worldwide web, 
what is “spilt-over” as opposed to “targeted” advertising may be difficult to 
discern, and may not concern consumers.  Moreover, goods are now often 
available for order and many are deliverable through the worldwide web.36  
The consuming public is also aware of licensing practices which may extend 
a foreign brand’s reach into a domestic market.  Domestic consumers with 
prior exposure to a brand abroad may therefore confuse a similar domestic 
brand to be the imported version or licensed extension of the foreign brand.  
That foreign brand would have domestic goodwill given its brand recognition 
even though domestic consumers do not travel abroad or order online to 
seek out the brand.     
 
Second, a key concern is that if foreign traders can successfully establish 
goodwill within a jurisdiction through advertising alone, they may gain a 
wide berth of opportunity protected under the law of passing off within the 
                                                          
34 Cheng Lim Saw, “Goodwill Hunting in Passing Off:  time to jettison the strict ‘hard line’ 
approach in England?” (2010) 8 Journal of Business Law 645 at 665. 
35 For example in cases dealing with extraterritorial goodwill:  Alain Bernardin et Cie v 
Pavilion Properties Ltd. [1967] F.S.R. 341; [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 584 – 585; Metric 
Resources Corporation [1979] F.S.R. 571 (Ch) at 577; The Athletes Foot Marketing 
Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 355 – 357; Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at 
[52], [62] – [63]; see also Jennifer Davis, “The Continuing Importance of Local Goodwill in 
Passing Off” (2015) 74(3) Cambridge Law Journal 419 at 421 – 422; in domestic cases:  S. 
Chivers & Sons (1900) 17 R.P.C. 420 (HCJ ChD) at 431; Brestian [1958] R.P.C. 161 (CA) at 
168; My Kinda Bones Limited [1984] F.S.R. 289 (Ch) at 299 – 300; cf Faulder & Co. Ld. 
(1903) 20 R.P.C. 477 (Ch) at 490 – 491 – the issue was not raised on appeal. 
36 For example:  Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [5], [6].  
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jurisdiction to expand their businesses directly or through licensing, and to 
deprive domestic businesses, coincidentally using an identical or a similar 
identifier, of that opportunity to expand within their home jurisdiction.  
Requiring customer presence within a jurisdiction under the law is an 
additional element that can be used to balance the interests between foreign 
and domestic traders.37  However, as a jurisdictional boundary falls between 
England and Scotland, inequity would occur when English traders with 
customers for branded goods (for example, a car wash service) available only 
on the Scottish side of the border would not have their goodwill protected on 
the English side regardless of the level of consumer brand recognition 
there,38 even though within England goodwill is protected by the locality 
affected by potential trade rather than confined and pinpointed to pre-
existing customers, as discussed earlier.   
 
Furthermore, this balance of interests between traders, whether domestic or 
foreign, may hinge upon the principles addressed in the other constituent 
elements of the tort beyond goodwill:  namely misrepresentation and 
damage.  While the presence of goodwill within a jurisdiction may be 
established without regard to the conduct of the disputing parties, 
misrepresentation requires the defendant’s representations to be misleading 
to the relevant public in a way that would likely harm the claimant’s 
goodwill.39  So even where there is goodwill as evidenced by public 
confusion between the claimant’s and the defendant’s goods, there is not 
necessarily misrepresentation on the part of the defendant.  Even where 
there is such misrepresentation, it may not be sufficient to likely harm the 
                                                          
37 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31at [62] – [63]; Christopher Wadlow, The Law of 
Passing-Off:  unfair competition by misrepresentation, 4th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2011) at [3-82]; see also Po Jen Yap, “Foreign Traders and Goodwill Hunting:  passed over or 
passing off?” (2009) 31(9) E.I.P.R. 448 with respect to using claimants’ intention as an 
additional element to balance the interests of the parties.  
38 For the Irish position, see C&A Modes v C&A (Waterford) Ltd. [1978] F.S.R.126; [1976] I.R. 
148 (SC Ireland); also A. Kelly Gill, “Protecting Extraterritorial Goodwill” in Catherine W. Ng, 
Lionel Bently, Giuseppina D’Agostino (eds), The Common Law of Intellectual Property – 
essays in honour of  Prof. David Vaver (Oxford:  Hart Publishing, 2010) at 351, 359 – 360.   
39 Premier Luggage and Bags Ltd. v Premier Company (UK) Ltd. [2002] EWCA Civ 387 at [37] 
– [41]; [2002] E.T.M.R. 69; Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. v Wards Mobility Services Ltd. [1994] 1 
W.L.R. 1564; [1995] F.S.R. 169 (Ch) at 175 (Jacob J.), as cited in L’Oreal S.A. v Bellure N.V. 
[2007] EWCA Civ 968 at [137], also [147] – [155]; [2008] E.C.C. 5; Comic Enterprises Ltd. v 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. [2016] EWCA Civ 41; [2016] E.C.C. 24.  
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claimant’s goodwill.  One example of this can be seen in a recent case 
concerning the US television series GLEE which proved popular among 
teenage consumers of the programme in the UK.40  The popularity of the 
television show in the UK about a singing club might limit a local business 
which used a similar mark (GLEE for live entertainment venues which wished 
to be differentiated from the defendant’s television show) in the same way 
that any advertising embedded in the show would, if such advertising would 
result in goodwill protected under the law of passing off.  In the GLEE case, 
while the Court of Appeal found a significant degree of confusion at some of 
the claimant’s live entertainment venues, it found on the part of the 
television company no actionable misrepresentation41 - the second element 
required for the tort of passing off.  The concern that protecting goodwill 
attached to international advertising by foreign enterprises may constrict 
business opportunities for their domestic counterparts should be similarly 
addressed within the other constituent elements of passing off.  To complete 
the tort of passing off, those elements further demand that the defendant’s 
representation in the marketplace be misleading in a way that would harm 
the claimant’s goodwill. 
 
Finally, the definition of “goodwill” and the right to protect goodwill against 
passing off42 are both matters of law which is jurisdictionally-bound.  The 
presence of goodwill may be evidenced by a presentation of facts.  Whether 
this state of facts within a jurisdiction is achieved through sales or 
advertising, directed or rendered within or from outside the jurisdiction is 
not a factor for consideration in establishing goodwill.  The formulation of 
goodwill under Reckitt and Colman Products Limited focuses on brand 
recognition by the relevant public, rather than the activities undertaken by 
the disputing parties.  Therefore, at its most basic level, goodwill is a passive 
yet attractive force which brings in custom.  It need not be strong enough to 
require customers to seek out the claimants’ goods.  Yet it needs to be 
strong enough for customers, prospective customers and similar 
                                                          
40 Comic Enterprises Ltd. [2016] EWCA Civ 41 at [15]; Leigh Smith, “Court of Appeal Rejects 
Appeal in GLEE Trade Mark Dispute” (2016) 38(7) E.I.P.R. 445; Kirsten Toft, “No Glee for Fox 
– Court of Appeal confirms relevance and admissibility of ‘wrong way round confusion’ 
evidence” (2016) 27(4) Ent. L.R. 151.  
41 Comic Enterprises Ltd. [2016] EWCA Civ 41 at [157] – [159].  
42 A.G. Spalding Bros. [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 147 (HL); Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 
at [21]. 
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stakeholders43 when making business decisions in the relevant jurisdiction 
to be able to attribute goods to be the claimants’ when presented with the 
distinguishing marks associated with the claimants in the marketplace.  
Having customers within a jurisdiction may, but does not necessarily support 
a finding of goodwill; it ought not be determinative of such a finding and 
pre-empt the full analysis of the tort.      
 
II. Jurisprudential Shifts   
  
Until recently, the preponderance of oft-cited case law dealing with 
extraterritorial goodwill treats the presence or absence of customers as part 
of the overall evidence viewed in the round to determine the presence or 
absence of goodwill within the jurisdiction, rather than as determinative of 
the finding of goodwill there.  The recent cases of The Athletes Foot 
Marketing Associates Inc. v Cobra Sports Ltd. and then Anheuser-Busch Inc. 
v Budejovicky Budvar N.P. with its extraordinary facts mark the points where 
having customers within a jurisdiction became a requirement for establishing 
goodwill within the jurisdiction.  In Starbucks (HK) Ltd. v British Sky 
Broadcasting Group Plc, the Supreme Court has maintained this requirement; 
showing customer presence is no longer merely part of the evidence to 
determine the presence of goodwill within a jurisdiction.    
 
The presentation of arguments for the presence of goodwill within a 
jurisdiction supported by evidence of customer presence there is apparent 
from the first oft-cited cases dealing with extraterritorial goodwill.  Société 
anonyme des anciens établissements Panhard et Levassor v Panhard-
Levassor Motor Co. Ltd. was decided in 1901.  The French claimants were a 
car manufacturer with no agency representation in England.  Nevertheless, 
their cars were frequently imported into England either by the British Motor 
Company, Limited or by private purchasers through specific patent licensing 
arrangements.  The court found that the claimants had a market in England 
and their name was known there and vulnerable to “having the benefit of his 
name annexed by a trader in England who assumes that name without any 
sort of justification.”44  As English customers sought out the claimants’ 
                                                          
43 Home Box Office Inc. [1982] F.S.R. 449 (Ch) at 456. 
44 Société anonyme des anciens établissements Panhard et Levassor v Panhard Levassor 
Motor Co. Ltd. [1901] 2 Ch. 513 (Ch) 516; (1901) 18 R.P.C. 405. 
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goods abroad, the claimants’ goodwill in England might be inferred.  The 
court intervened against the defendants’ use of the claimants’ mark to avoid 
confusion or deception caused by such use in the English market.    
 
The next two cases again present arguments supported by evidence of 
customer presence within the jurisdiction.  The 1920 case of Poiret v Jules 
Poiret Ltd. involves a French fashion designer who enjoyed great reputation 
in England and served his customers in England through regular visits by 
himself or his assistant.  Even though he never paid for any advertisement in 
England, the demand for his goods in England was evidenced by a high-
profile invitation from England to showcase his goods there.  Moreover, 
trade data showed the extent of his business in England.  The Court found 
that the plaintiff, Paul Poiret, was “entitled to protect his goods and the 
reputation he has acquired in this country notwithstanding the fact that he 
has not a place of business here”.45  The court recognised that the public 
might confuse the defendant’s use of POIRET to be the plaintiff’s in opening 
a branch operation in England.  It also found the defendant deliberately 
exploited the name there. 
 
While Sheraton Corp. of America v Sheraton Motels Ltd.46 mentions the 
plaintiff’s booking offices within the jurisdiction – often cited in subsequent 
cases as sufficient to establish goodwill there,47 the interlocutory decision 
appears to be based on the further fact that actual confusion had already 
occurred given the plaintiff’s international reputation.  Those anxious to 
carry out the defendant’s construction work for the hotel project in England 
had contacted the US plaintiff, thinking the project was the plaintiff’s 
because of the similarity between the parties’ names.48  Such confusion 
would indicate plaintiff’s goodwill within the jurisdiction was sufficient to 
warrant protection under the law of passing off.  As further grounds for 
                                                          
45 Poiret v Jules Poiret Ltd. (1920) 37 R.P.C. 177 (Ch) at 188. 
46 Sheraton Corp. of America v Sheraton Motels Ltd. [1964] R.P.C. 202 (Ch).  
47 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 586 – 587; Globelegance B.V. v Sarkissian 
[1973] F.S.R. 461 (Ch) at 473; [1974] R.P.C. 603; The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates 
Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 353, 356; Home Box Office Inc. [1982] F.S.R. 449 (Ch) at 455 – 
456; Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 52; Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 
413 (CA) at 466; Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [34]; cf Hotel Cipriani Srl. v Hotel 
Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd. [2010] EWCA Civ 110 at [108(1)]; [2010] Bus. L.R. 1465.  
48 Sheraton Corp. of America [1964] R.P.C. 202 (Ch) at 203. 
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goodwill might be established at trial, an interlocutory injunction was 
granted to restrain the defendant from advertising under SHERATON to avoid 
any association with the plaintiff’s business.   
 
The next oft-cited case of Alain Bernardin et Cie v Pavilion Properties Ltd. is 
remarkable for its focus on the plaintiff’s activities in its analysis to establish 
goodwill in the jurisdiction.  The facts are typical:  the French plaintiff had 
advertised his high quality Parisian cabaret CRAZY HORSE SALOON 
continuously and extensively in the UK for some 16 years.  Evidence showed 
UK residents were familiar with the plaintiff’s business from their travels to 
Paris.49  The defendant started a similar but members-only enterprise in 
London under the same name with advertisements set in a similar style as 
those of the claimant’s.  One contained the headline “Crazy Horse Saloon 
comes to London.”50   
 
The court’s findings are notable because first, they set a high watermark for 
suggesting that the claimant must carry on business, such as a booking 
service, within the jurisdiction to establish goodwill there51 - a suggestion 
largely criticised in subsequent cases.52  Second, the court distinguished 
Poiret and Sheraton Corp. of America53 on the basis that the plaintiffs in 
Poiret visited London to carry on business there, and those in Sheraton Corp. 
of America had taken bookings in England for hotel services rendered 
abroad.  While those cases were not decided solely on these bases but rather 
took a broader account of the overall principle of the law of passing off, this 
characterisation of the cases lingered in subsequent cases.54  Third, the 
court summarised the issue in the case as:  “whether the owner of an 
establishment carried on abroad can maintain a passing off action in this 
country in circumstances in which he has carried on no activities whatever in 
                                                          
49 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 585. 
50 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 582. 
51 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 587. 
52 See for example Globelegance B.V. [1973] F.S.R. 461 (Ch) at 476; Maxim’s Limited [1977] 
F.S.R. 364 (Ch) at 367 – 368; Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 58.  
53 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 587.  
54 For example:  The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 351 – 
354, 356; Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 53; cf Metric Resources Corporation 
[1979] F.S.R. 571 (Ch) at 577 – 578.  
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this country except sending advertising material to this country.”55  The 
analysis for establishing goodwill shifted focus from an assessment of public 
brand recognition to that of the claimant’s activities.     
 
Above all, by attempting to assess the presence of goodwill in such terms, 
the court in Alain Bernardin et Cie found “with considerable reluctance”, the 
principle of the law compromised, when it appeared 
“perfectly clear that the defendant company has chosen the identical 
name ‘Crazy Horse Saloon’ with the sole purpose of ‘cashing in’ on the 
reputation in the wider sense, of the plaintiff company, and again has 
deliberately copied in its decoration and advertisement those of the 
plaintiff company’s establishment.  If I were able to hold that the 
plaintiff company had established a reputation in the relevant sense in 
this country, then I would have no hesitation in holding that the acts of 
the defendant company were calculated to cause deception or 
confusion and I would grant an injunction, but I do not think I am 
entitled to do so.”56    
The “reputation” here was found insufficient for the law to protect in order to 
prevent public deception.  While Alain Bernardin et Cie was cited in Amway 
Corp. v Eurway International Ltd. for the proposition that “[s]ome knowledge 
of the name of the plaintiffs in this country without any business activities 
here would quite clearly not be sufficient”,57 in Amway Corp., there appeared 
to be little evidence in the interlocutory motion of actual public knowledge of 
the plaintiff’s business to establish any level of domestic goodwill.58  The 
plaintiff’s advertising in American magazines with large UK circulation did 
not create sufficient public recognition of the plaintiff’s goods in the UK to 
meet the requirement of the tort.   
 
From the analytical shift in Alain Bernardin et Cie, the cases after Amway 
Corp. again show that having customers within the relevant jurisdiction was 
part of the overall evidence to substantiate a finding of goodwill which 
warranted protection there.  Mindful of Alain Bernardin et Cie, Globelegance 
B.V. v Sarkissian found sufficient sale of the plaintiff’s fashion and 
                                                          
55 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 583. 
56 Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch) at 588. 
57 Amway Corp. v Eurway International Ltd. [1973] F.S.R. 213 (Ch) at 220; [1974] R.P.C. 82. 
58 Amway Corp. [1973] F.S.R. 213 (Ch) at 222.  
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accessories bearing his VALENTINO mark within the jurisdiction, 
supplemented by his reputation and activities beyond, to succeed in an 
interlocutory motion.  It found travellers familiar with the mark abroad and 
readers of fashion reviews would also be susceptible to confusion with the 
defendant’s fashion boutique of the same name:59    
 
Likewise, J.C. Penney Company Inc. v Penney’s Ltd.60 granted interlocutory 
injunctive relief to protect the goodwill of the well-known American 
department store which had sold and advertised their branded textile goods 
widely in UK shops.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged the High Court’s 
view that goodwill need not be established on actual use of the mark alone.  
Although such use might be an important factor, it might be supplemented 
by other evidence such as advertising.61  Baskin Robbins Ice Cream Co. v 
Gutman also saw “from the general line of past authority, that that existence 
and extent of the plaintiffs’ reputation and goodwill in every case is one of 
fact however it may be proved and whatever it is based on.”62  In Maxim’s 
Limited v Dye, the plaintiff had not carried on any business in England but 
had since 1907 owned the world famous Parisian MAXIM’S restaurant which 
was extensively patronised by English residents who would book their tables 
from England.  The judge in Maxim’s Limited reiterated part of his decision 
from Baskin Robbins Ice Cream Co. to find  
“In circumstances such as the present it also seems to me that a 
plaintiff’s existing goodwill in this country, which derives from and is 
based on a foreign business … may be regarded as prospective but 
none the less real in relation to any future business which may later be 
set up by the plaintiff in this country.”63   
He saw no reason why the reality of the plaintiff’s reputation in the UK 
should not be protected.64   
 
The primary consideration in these cases, with the exception of Alain 
Bernardin et Cie, was whether or not the plaintiffs established sufficient 
recognition of their marks for the underlying goods such that confusion 
                                                          
59 Globelegance B.V. [1973] F.S.R. 461 (Ch) at 466, 468, 473 – 474.  
60 J.C. Penney Company Inc. v Penney’s Ltd. [1975] F.S.R. 367 (CA).  
61 J.C. Penney Company Inc. [1975] F.S.R. 367 (CA) at 374, 382 – 383.  
62 Baskin Robbins Ice Cream Co. v Gutman [1976] F.S.R. 545 (Ch) at 548. 
63 Maxim’s Limited [1977] F.S.R. 364 (Ch) at 368. 
64 Maxim’s Limited [1977] F.S.R. 364 (Ch) at 371. 
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among the relevant public would likely occur when the defendants used 
identical or similar marks for their goods within the same jurisdiction.  
Whether or not plaintiffs had customers in the jurisdiction played an 
evidentiary role in the consideration, but not a determinative one.  
 
The court in the 1980 case of The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. 
however found the absence of customers within the jurisdiction to be 
determinative of the absence of goodwill there.  It also set out “as a pure 
point of principle”, that 
“Passing off is a tort; and the gist of the action is damage.  If there can 
be no damage, therefore there can be no action.  This would, therefore 
be a complete answer to any claim by the well known London store if a 
Bedouin trader were to set himself up in the middle of the desert as 
‘Harrods’.  He would neither be diverting custom which should go to 
the real Harrods into his own shop, nor would there be any possibility 
of any confusion which could harm the real Harrods. 
 
Generalising this obvious example, it would appear to me that, as a 
matter of principle, no trader can complain of passing off as against 
him in any territory … in which he has no customers, nobody who is in 
a trade relation with him.  This will normally shortly be expressed by 
saying that he does not carry on any trade in that particular country 
…”65 
This “principle” worked on the particular facts of the case.  The plaintiffs 
there offered franchising operations which sold third party merchandise.  
The goodwill in question was for sales services; no post-sale confusion 
appeared to be at issue.  While the American plaintiffs had shown knowledge 
of their operation among members of the public in England, the court found 
however “by far the vast majority of the defendants’ potential customers”66 
had not heard of the plaintiffs or their chain of franchised shops.   
 
Significantly, the court observed a consistency in showing the presence of 
customers in extraterritoriality cases, albeit at times such finding was thin.67  
                                                          
65 The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 350, see also 351. 
66 The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 348. 
67 The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 351 in reference to 
Poiret (1920) 37 R.P.C. 177 (Ch); at 356 in reference to Sheraton Corp. of America [1964] 
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The court concluded that the law appeared clear that while the plaintiffs 
need not carry on business within the relevant jurisdiction, it must have 
customers there.  Reputation brought by advertising alone would not 
suffice.68  By requiring customer presence within the jurisdiction, the court’s 
evidentiary concerns pre-empted the full analysis of the law.   
 
This approach where the absence of customers would be determinative of 
the absence of goodwill echo resoundingly in the 2:1 majority decision at the 
Court of Appeal in Anheuser-Busch Inc.69 with its extraordinary facts.  There 
the American plaintiffs’ BUDWEISER beer was well-known to a substantial 
number of people in England from their visits to the US and from the 
advertisements in American magazines circulated in England.  In England the 
beer was available only at American military bases, embassy, and clubs and 
through overspill from these restricted supply areas, and was sold only to 
American personnel and invitees, at the rate of 5,000,000 cans annually.  
The Czech defendants supplied beer in England under the same name.  Lord 
Oliver70 and Lord Dillon71 both found that however widespread the 
claimants’ reputation, the claimants had not established goodwill in the 
jurisdiction because the claimants were neither carrying on business nor 
capturing ordinary customers in England in any real sense.   
 
Lord O’Connor found the claimants had goodwill in England because sales 
did take place on English soil.  However, he found the element of likelihood 
of harm to the claimants’ goodwill as a constituent element of the tort72 
unfulfilled because the claimants’ beer was supplied duty-free and only at 
the restricted locations.73   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
R.P.C. 202 (Ch); at 355 in reference to Globelegance B.V. [1973] F.S.R. 461 (Ch); at 356 in 
reference to Metric Resources Corporation [1979] F.S.R. 571 (Ch). 
68 The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch) at 357. 
69 Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA). 
70 Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 467. 
71 Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 476. 
72 required under Erven Warnink B.V. [1979] A.C. 731 (HL) (also required under Reckitt and 
Colman Products Limited [1990] W.L.R. 491(HL) at 499 though this case predates Reckitt 
Colman Products Limited). 
73 Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 471 – 2.  
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Unlike the HARRODS trader in a desert scenario from The Athletes Foot 
Marketing Associates Inc., the trial judge in Anheuser-Busch Inc. had 
established that the plaintiffs’ beer was well known in the UK through spill-
over advertising from the US or through UK residents travelling to the US.  
He also found in the UK “a much more pronounced association of the name 
BUDWEISER with the plaintiffs’ beer than with the first defendants’ beer.”74  
“In fact there was ample and unchallenged evidence of confusion.”75  Such 
confusion should support a finding of goodwill because the public would 
recognise the plaintiffs’ marks or similar indicia on the goods and attribute 
them as the plaintiffs’.  The goodwill outside the plaintiffs’ exclusive 
distribution zones remained, albeit unrealised or unrealisable, asset for the 
plaintiffs.  Nevertheless, as in The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. 
which required claimants to have customers within a jurisdiction to establish 
the first element of goodwill there, the Court of Appeal now affirmed the 
paramountcy of the evidentiary requirement and cut short considerations 
under the full analysis of the law.   
 
Pete Waterman Ltd. v C.B.S. United Kingdom Ltd.76 next observed:  “Once it is 
found that there are customers, it is open to find that there is a business 
here to which the local goodwill is attached.”77 [emphasis added]  In this case 
the services of THE HIT FACTORY New York were rendered exclusively 
outside the UK.78  Nevertheless because of its reputation in the UK and 
worldwide, it drew substantial custom from the UK as evidenced by the 
bookings made for UK artists, albeit through US companies.  The court 
warned the law would fail if it did not try to acknowledge changes in trading 
patterns brought on by advances in transportation and telecommunication 
technology:79    
“As a matter of legal principle, I can see no reason why the courts of 
this country should not protect the trading relationship between a 
foreign trader and his United Kingdom customers by restraining 
anyone in this country from passing himself off as the foreign trader.  
The essence of a claim in passing off is that the defendant is 
                                                          
74 Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 459 – 460, 462, 464.  
75 Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 461. 
76 Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch). 
77 Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 58. 
78 Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 40 – 41.  
79 Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 50 – 51.  
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interfering with the goodwill of the plaintiff.  The essence of the 
goodwill is the ability to attract customers and potential customers to 
do business with the owner of the goodwill.”80    
The court found THE HIT FACTORY New York had substantial number of 
customers in England and would be entitled to protect its name there against 
third parties. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Hotel Cipriani Srl v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd.81 
however felt bound by the proposition in Anheuser-Busch Inc.   
“that an undertaking which seeks to establish goodwill in relation to a 
mark for goods cannot do so, however great may be the reputation of 
his mark in the United Kingdom, unless it has customers among the 
general public in the United Kingdom for those products.”82   
In Hotel Cipriani Srl, the court found the first claimant had both a substantial 
reputation in England and substantial number of customers from England 
attracted by the international reputation of Hotel Ciprian and its CIPRIANI 
mark.83  Without adopting any general principle, the court cautioned that:  
“with many establishments worldwide featuring on their own or shared 
websites, through which their services and facilities can be booked 
directly (or their goods can be ordered directly) from anywhere in the 
world, the test of direct bookings may be increasingly outmoded.  It 
would be salutary for the test to be reviewed in an appropriate case.  
However, it does not seem to me that this case offers a suitable 
opportunity.”84   
 
In view of such case law and that from other common law jurisdictions,85 the 
Supreme Court in 2015 in Starbucks (HK) Ltd. stated its preference for legal 
                                                          
80 Pete Waterman Ltd. [1993] E.M.L.R. 27 (Ch) at 51. 
81 Hotel Cipriani Srl [2010] EWCA Civ 110.  
82 Hotel Cipriani Srl [2010] EWCA Civ 110 at [107]; see also Christopher Wadlow, “Hotel 
Cipriani Srl v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd [2010] EWCA 110; [2010] R.P.C. 16:  the Court 
of Appeal draws the line on whether a foreign business has an English goodwill or not” 
(2011) 33(1) E.I.P.R. 54 at 58. 
83 Hotel Cipriani Srl [2010] EWCA Civ 110 at [118]. 
84 Hotel Cipriani Srl [2010] EWCA Civ 110 at [124]. 
85 Cf Christopher Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off:  unfair competition by misrepresentation, 
5th edn (London:  Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) at [3-121]. 
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certainty86 and required claimants to have customers within a jurisdiction to 
establish goodwill there.  The case involves a pay television operator which 
had 1.2 million subscribers in Hong Kong and had been delivering contents 
via closed-circuit internet protocol (IPTV) there since 2003.  The services 
initially launched as NOW BROADBAND TV, became NOW TV in 2006.  Some 
of the Chinese programmes were branded under NOW; the claimants’ 
channel also carried English programmes.  These services were not 
accessible to the UK.  With a view to expand into the UK market, in 2012 the 
claimants launched a NOW player app in the UK on their website and via the 
Apple App store “to warm up the market for the launch of NOW TV on the 
platform of its proposed UK partner”87 for Chinese speakers in the UK.  The 
defendants were British broadcasters who launched new IPTV services under 
the name NOW TV in beta form in 2012.   
 
The Supreme Court noted four ways in which those in the UK might have 
been exposed to the Hong Kong claimants’ services.  First, “Chinese 
speakers permanently or temporarily resident in the UK in 2012 were aware 
of the NOW TV service through exposure to it when residing in or visiting 
Hong Kong.”88  At trial, Arnold J. found a substantial number of Chinese 
acquainted with claimants’ NOW TV in this way.89  He also found the 
claimants enjoyed a modest but more than de minimis reputation among 
Chinese speakers in the UK based on their exposure in the remaining three 
ways, namely:90  The claimants’ materials had been accessible free of charge 
at the claimants’ website.  The claimants’ programmes and trailers from 
NOW TV had been available on the claimants’ channel on the YouTube 
website.  Finally, a few of the claimants’ programmes were available on 
demand on international flights into the UK.91   
 
The Supreme Court concluded:   
“In order to establish goodwill, the claimant must have customers 
within the jurisdiction, as opposed to people in the jurisdiction who 
                                                          
86 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [49]. 
87 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [5]. 
88 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [4]. 
89 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. v British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc [2012] EWHC 3074 at [58]; [2013] 
F.S.R. 29. 
90 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2012] EWHC 3074 at [146]. 
91 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [10] – [11]. 
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happen to be customers elsewhere.  Thus, where the claimant’s 
business is carried on abroad, it is not enough for a claimant to show 
that there are people in this jurisdiction who happen to be its 
customers when they are abroad.”92 
The question nevertheless remains:  if a sufficient number of English 
residents, “who happen to be [the claimants’] customers when they are 
abroad” and may also be customers in England, upon seeing the defendant’s 
similar mark in England would likely confuse it as the claimants’ or as that of 
an entity licensed, endorsed by or connected with the claimants, could the 
claimants’ goodwill in England not be inferred?  For such likelihood of 
confusion to occur, the claimants must have had goodwill in England as a 
point of reference, whether or not the claimants had targeted their 
marketing there or had customers there, however their goodwill there had 
been achieved.   
 
This series of oft-cited case law involving extraterritorial goodwill shows that 
the claimants’ customer presence, albeit small at times,93 has been 
consistently presented to support a finding of goodwill within the relevant 
jurisdiction.  The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. rationalises this 
presentation of having domestic customers as a requirement to determine 
the presence of goodwill there.  That requirement was applied under the 
exceptional facts in Anheuser-Busch Inc.  While Pete Waterman Ltd. which 
followed appears to view the presence of domestic customers as opening the 
way to finding local goodwill, the Court of Appeal in Hotel Cipriani Srl felt 
bound by the finding in Anheuser-Busch Inc.  The Supreme Court in 
Starbucks (HK) Ltd. found it important to maintain legal certainty and 
required claimants to have customers within a jurisdiction to establish 
goodwill there.  The presence of customers became determinative for the 
finding of goodwill.  
 
Cases such as Globelegance B.V., Pete Waterman Ltd., and Hotel Cipriani Srl 
have underlined how advances in telecommunication, transportation, and 
branding practices may impact on consumer brand recognition in the 
                                                          
92 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [52]. 
93 Belinda Mills, “Trade Marks:  injunction granted for US company without UK presence” 
(1996) 18(5) E.I.P.R. D147; David Rose, “Season of Goodwill:  passing off and overseas 
traders” (1996) 18(6) E.I.P.R. 356 at 359. 
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marketplace.  The Supreme Court concluded its analysis based on whether 
those who recognised the brand in England were in fact customers 
elsewhere, rather than the level of brand recognition achieved within the 
jurisdiction regardless of how it was achieved.  In an age of worldwide web, 
social media communication and easy low-cost travel, brand promotion and 
dissemination are not unidirectional – from the brand owner to prospective 
consumers, but rather multidirectional - from brand owner to prospective 
consumers as well as from celebrity or peer consumers to other 
consumers.94  The use of product placement is one example that attests to 
brand promotion through perceived celebrity “consumers”.  Having the 
JAMES BOND character wear OMEGA watches promotes the latter to JAMES 
BOND fans.  The Reckitt and Colman Products Limited test does not assess 
goodwill based on how the disputing parties conduct their businesses or 
promote their brands, but rather how well consumers recognise their brands.  
 
III. Challenging the “Goodwill” vs “Mere Reputation” Distinction 
 
Extraterritorial goodwill cases95 often set “goodwill” as that established 
through the sale of goods in contradistinction from “mere reputation” as that 
engendered through advertising alone; the former is said to be protected 
under the law of passing off, the latter not.  However, within the context of 
presale advertising, the law is increasingly showing a tendency to see 
advertising also as a way of generating goodwill susceptible to protection 
under the law of passing off.  Moreover, the law has long protected the 
goodwill of professional and trade governing and promoting bodies and 
charities which may not trade, have no trade customers, but have public 
brand recognition.  This foundation has given rise to recent protection 
                                                          
94 Dev S. Gangjee, “Property in Brands:  the commodification of conversation” in Helena 
Howe and Jonathan Griffiths (eds), Concepts of Property in Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 2013) <http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2235721> 
(accessed 29 May 2017).  See also Catherine W. Ng, “A Common Law of Identity Signs” 
(2007) 20 I.P.J. 177 at 253 – 255.  
95 See Alain Bernardin et Cie [1967] R.P.C. 581 (Ch); Metric Resources Corporation [1979] 
F.S.R. 571 (Ch); The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. [1980] R.P.C. 343 (Ch); 
Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31; also Anheuser-Busch Inc. [1984] F.S.R. 413 (CA) at 465 
(Oliver L.J.), at 471 (O’Connor L.J.), at 476 (Dillon L.J.); Hotel Cipriani Srl. [2010] EWCA Civ 
110 at [106], [116] – [124]. 
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against false endorsement and merchandising claims within the commercial 
sectors. 
 
A. Presale Advertising 
 
The Supreme Court in Starbucks (HK) Ltd.96 cited Maxwell v Hogg97 as “the 
first case in which an English court specifically decided that mere reputation, 
without sale of goods, was not enough to found a passing off claim.”98  The 
law however was at the cross-roads of development in the 1867 decision.  
There, the Court of Appeal offered two views of goodwill:  one by Lord 
Turner, the other by Lord Cairns.  As the concept became clearer in passing 
off jurisprudence, it affirmed the view of Lord Cairns:  he relied upon Lord 
Westbury’s finding in M’Andrew v Bassett that the property to be protected 
in the passing off cases lied with the currency gained by the plaintiff’s trade 
mark to identify goods of desired quality “or of some other circumstances 
that render the article acceptable to the public.”99  Unlike Lord Turner, he did 
not premise this “property right” upon “the expenditure made by Mr Maxwell 
upon his intended work of BELGRAVIA and the advertisements issued by 
him”100 – the conduct of the party.  Instead, it was premised upon the public 
recognition of a party’s mark to identify the underlying goods as those of the 
party.  Both Lord Turner and Lord Cairns expressed the evidentiary difficulty 
in ascertaining the level of reputation that would be required to establish 
goodwill without sales.101  Recent obiter in a Court of Appeal decision 
dealing with presale advertising suggests that this recognition can be 
achieved without sale.102 
 
Throughout the jurisprudence often cited in relation to presale advertising 
goodwill, there appears to be recognition that the reputation or goodwill 
engendered through advertising alone is not different in kind from that 
                                                          
96 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [35]. 
97 Maxwell v Hogg (1866-67) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 307. 
98 Starbucks (HK) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 31 at [35]. 
99 M’Andrew v Bassett (1864) 4 De Gex, Jones & Smith 380 at 386, 385; (1864) 46 E.R. 965 
(Ch) at 968, 967; as cited in Maxwell v Hogg (1866-67) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 307 at 314.  
100 Maxwell (1866-67) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 307 at 311. 
101 Maxwell (1866-67) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 307 at 313. 
102 Marcus Publishing Plc [1990] R.P.C. 576 (CA) at 585 (Staughton L.J.), see also at 584 
(Dillon L.J.), at 585-585 (Mann L.J.). 
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engendered through the sale of goods.  Lord Westbury’s approach in 
M’Andrew and Lord Cairn’s approach in Maxwell were followed at the Court 
of Appeal in Licensed Victuallers’ Newspaper Company v Bingham,103 where 
Lord Bowen found “there must have been such a sale as will establish in the 
mind of the public a connection between the name and the plaintiffs’ 
newspaper” in order to show “the defendant is doing something calculated to 
deceive, that people are likely to buy the defendants’ newspaper in the belief 
that it is that of the plaintiffs.”104  As a reasonable period of time would be 
needed to establish this connection, first publication would be a way of 
marking the start of this period.105  Here the branded advertisement and the 
first sale of the newspaper differed by mere days; the former first occurred 
on the same day that the defendant introduced its paper.  The claimant’s 
brief head start did not result in sufficient public knowledge of the 
claimant’s goods given the small circulation.  From this finding in Licensed 
Victuallers’ Newspaper Company, the court in the 1965 case of W.H. Allen & 
Co. v Brown Watson Ltd.106 concluded that given the claimants had 
established a distinctive reputation in the book title MY LIFE AND LOVES BY 
FRANK HARRIS from the wide publicity generated prior to the publication of 
the book, the defendant’s publication of FRANK HARRIS:  MY LIFE AND LOVES 
would confuse the public.  Interlocutory injunction was granted; the 
plaintiffs’ book was nevertheless published by the time the interlocutory 
motion was heard.  While B.B.C. v Talbot Motor Company Ltd.107 in 1981 
relied on W.H. Allen & Co. for the proposition that presale advertising could 
establish goodwill to support an action in passing off, the court in My Kinda 
Bones Limited v Dr. Pepper’s Stove Co. Ltd. distinguished B.B.C. as 
anomalous, and W.H. Allen & Co. because that plaintiffs’ book was published 
by the time of the motion.  It found the claimant’s goodwill must be 
established by having its goods on the market so that customers or potential 
customers would have sufficient opportunity to judge the merit of the goods 
themselves.  However if this were so, the law would only protect repeat 
purchases as discussed earlier.  Crucially the case admitted:  “It may well be 
that, if the goods or services are placed on the market after extensive 
                                                          
103 Licensed Victuallers’ Newspaper Company v Bingham (1888) 38 Ch. D. 139 (CA).  
104 Licensed Victuallers’ Newspaper Company (1888) 38 Ch. D. 139 (CA) at 143. 
105 Licensed Victuallers’ Newspaper Company (1888) 38 Ch. D. 139 (CA) at 143. 
106 W.H. Allen & Co. v Brown Watson Ltd. [1965] R.P.C. 191 (Ch); Times November 21, 1964.  
107 B.B.C. [1981] F.S.R. 228 (Ch). 
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preparatory publicity, a very short time thereafter will suffice for the public 
to assess their merits and for the relevant reputation to be acquired.”108   
 
Presale publicity can contribute to the creation and cultivation of goodwill 
which would be protected under the law of passing off.  Such publicity may 
encourage prospective customers to try and judge the claimant’s goods for 
themselves; it also recommends the claimant’s goods in the same way that 
wrappers of those goods do once the goods appear in the marketplace.109  
By 1989, in Marcus Publishing Plc v Hutton-Wild Communications Limited, all 
three Lord Justices at the Court of Appeal mentioned in obiter the possibility 
that goodwill might be created through “lavish hospitality or advertising of 
some kind.”110  While the evidence presented by both parties was too weak 
to support injunctive relief in that case, there appears to be recognition that 
advertising may contribute to a claimant’s goodwill.   
 
B. Endorsement and Merchandising 
 
Furthermore, the law of passing off has long been protecting professional 
and trade governing and promoting bodies and   from having their names 
used by third parties.111  These claimants may have neither trade nor 
customers in any jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, they have public brand 
                                                          
108 My Kinda Bones Limited [1984] F.S.R. 289 (Ch) at 299, 301 – 303.  
109 Faulder & Co. Ld. (1903) 20 R.P.C. 477 (CA) at 490 – 491, initially citing Price’s Patent 
Candle Company, Ld. V Jeyes’ Sanitary Compounds Company, Ld. (1901) 19(3) R.P.C. 17 
(CA) 23:  ‘”The poster is intended to invite persons just as much as a wrapper.”  That is this 
case.  It is based entirely upon the circular and poster which is intended to be read just as a 
label upon the box, although it may not be quite so close to the goods as a label.  Still it is 
intended to invite persons to come and buy the Plaintiffs’ jam when in fact it is not their 
jam.’   
110 Marcus Publishing Plc [1990] R.P.C. 576 (CA) at 585 (Staughton L.J.), see also at 584 
(Dillon L.J.), at 585-585 (Mann L.J.); Labyrinth Media Limited v Brave World Limited [1995] 
E.M.L.R. 38 (Ch) at 47. 
111 For example Society of Accountants and Auditors v Goodway and London Association of 
Accountants and Auditors, Limited [1907] 1 Ch. 489 (Ch); British Medical Association v 
Marsh (1931) 48 R.P.C. 565 (Ch); The Law Society of England and Wales v Griffiths [1995] 
R.P.C. 16 (Ch) in respect of an Accident Helpline service; The Law Society of England and 
Wales v Society of Lawyers [1996] F.S.R. 739; (1996) 19(6) I.P.D. 19049 (Ch); The British 
Diabetic Association v The Diabetic Society [1995] 4 All E.R. 812; [1996] F.S.R. 1 (Ch); 
Artistic Upholstery Ltd. v Art Forma (Furniture Ltd) [1999] 4 All E.R. 277; [2000] F.S.R. 311 
(Ch).  
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recognition.  While their goodwill is not aimed at generating revenue, courts 
have rationalised harm to goodwill in terms of potential loss of 
membership112 and associated fees in some cases, and loss of donation or 
sponsorship in charity cases.113  In obiter, a court has acknowledged such 
harm to be artificially construed to fit within the requirements of the law of 
passing off.114  Moreover, courts have recognised that claimants’ goodwill 
could suffer by false appearances of association, endorsement115 or 
affiliation116 with their defendants.  The loss of control over one’s name has 
also been recognised as a loss that would be difficult to quantify in 
extraterritorial goodwill cases.117  
 
In 2002, the High Court in Irvine v Talksport Ltd. drew on British Medical 
Association v Marsh which upheld a passing off claim when the claimant’s 
well-known initials “B.M.A.” for the non-trade medical professional body 
were used by the defendant for the sale of medicine.  The Court observed in 
Irvine:  “Thus it was damage to the reputation of the BMA which perfected 
the cause of action, the loss of membership was the consequence in money 
terms of that damage.”118  The case explicitly rejected a perceived 
requirement of the law that the disputing parties needed to share a common 
field of trade – a requirement often attributed to McCulloch v Lewis A. May 
(Produce Distributors) Ltd.,119 and later found to be merely a way to establish 
                                                          
112 For example Society of Accountants and Auditors [1907] 1 Ch. 489 (Ch) at 502; British 
Medical Association (1931) 48 R.P.C. 565 (Ch); National Guild of Removers & Storers Ltd v 
Silveria [2010] EWPCC 015; [2011] F.S.R. 9; cf The Law Society of England and Wales [1996] 
F.S.R. 739 (Ch) at 752.  See also Brian Whitehead and Richard Kempner, “Can You Recover 
Money when there are No Lost Sales and No Profits?” (2011) 6(4) Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law & Practice 216. 
113 British Legion v British Legion Club (Street) Ld. (1931) 48 R.P.C. 555 (Ch). 
114 Artistic Upholstery Ltd. [2000] F.S.R. 311 (Ch) at [45]. 
115 British Medical Association (1931) 48 R.P.C. 565 (Ch); Gary Scanlan, “Personality, 
Endorsement and Everything:  the modern law of passing off and the myth of the personality 
right” (2003) 25(12) E.I.P.R. 563. 
116 British Legion (1931) 48 R.P.C. 555 (Ch); The Law Society of England and Wales [1996] 
F.S.R. 739. 
117 Jian Tools for Sales Inc. [1995] F.S.R. 924 (Ch) at 941; see also Ewing [1917] 2 Ch. 1 (CA) 
at 13. 
118 Irvine v Talksport Ltd. [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch) at [21]; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2355. 
119 McCulloch v Lewis A. May (Produce Distributors) Ltd. [1947] 2 All E.R. 845; (1948) 65 
R.P.C. 58 (Ch).  
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the conditions where confusion would likely occur.120  As traders leverage 
their goodwill across trade sectors, interlopers may exploit this branding 
practice.  They may use a claimant’s mark in sectors beyond the claimant’s 
to misrepresent the interlopers’ goods as the claimant’s in the public’s mind.  
If claimants need to have existing customers within the defendants’ trade 
sector to establish passing off, the law would not be able to prevent such 
misrepresentation from the start. 
 
In Irvine, the well-known Formula One racer successfully claimed in passing 
off against a sports radio station for the use of Irvine’s photograph in 
Talksport Ltd.’s advertisement.  Irvine had endorsed products such as 
clothing121 and razors.122  These endorsements were likely valued not for his 
expertise on the merit of the goods as contended in cases such as My Kinda 
Bone Limited, but for “the lustre of [Irvine’s] famous personality” to enhance 
the attractiveness of the endorsed goods to their target market.123  At the 
Court of Appeal, Irvine’s award of damages was substantially increased to 
reflect the value of the endorsement business generated from leveraging his 
celebrity goodwill across trade sectors.124   
 
Likewise, the law now protects goodwill within a merchandising context.  
Fenty v Arcadian Group Brands Limited125 involves the pop star Rihanna who 
enjoyed goodwill in both the music and fashion industries.  She had her own 
branded fashion and had also licensed promotional merchandise such as 
clothing for her concert tours.  Such merchandised clothing would typically 
be of a lower quality and bear the image of the star on the front.  The 
defendant marketed a T-shirt using Rihanna’s image taken when she was on 
a video shoot for her music video cover.126  As a high street fashion retailer, 
the defendant had previously featured celebrity endorsements127 and had 
                                                          
120 Annabel’s (Berkeley Square) Ltd. v G. Schock [1972] F.S.R. 261; [1972] R.P.C. 838 (CA); 
Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd. [1977] F.S.R. 62 (Ch).  
121 Irvine v Talksport Ltd. [2003] EWCA 423 at [55]; [2003] 2 All E.R. 881.  
122 Irvine [2003] EWCA 423 at [76]. 
123 Irvine [2002] EWHC 367 at [39]; see also Fenty [2015] EWCA 3 at [38]. 
124 Irvine [2003] EWCA 423 at [111] – [116], followed in Hearst Holdings Inc. [2014] EWHC 
439 (Ch). 
125 Fenty [2013] EWHC 2310 at [33]. 
126 Fenty [2015] EWCA 3 at [2], [20] – [21].  
127 Fenty [2013] EWHC 2310 at [55]; Fenty [2015] EWCA 3 at [16], [52]. 
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also promoted Rihanna as a fashion icon.128  Cognisant of the branding 
practices in the marketplace, the court applied the same legal principle as 
articulated in Irvine to protect Rihanna’s goodwill.129  The court recognised 
harm to Rihanna not only in terms of lost sales to her merchandising 
business, but also of a loss of control over her reputation.130  
 
The law of passing off appears poised to protect a claimant’s goodwill in 
these circumstances, as well as those where the claimant’s presale 
advertising may be exploited to misrepresent another’s goods.  In these 
cases, there appears to be emerging recognition that the perceived 
dichotomy between “goodwill” established through trade and “mere 
reputation” established through advertising alone so often featured in 
passing off cases dealing with extraterritorial goodwill, appears illusory.  
Indeed, goodwill results from the public engagement with a trader’s goods, 
merchandising, and adverting alike.  Brand recognition may be publicly 
promoted directly by the brand owner, as well as indirectly by celebrity or 
peer consumers and endorsers, among others. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Within the broader fabric of the law of passing off in the contexts of presale 
advertising cases and false endorsement and merchandising cases, the 
courts are recognising branding practices which may lead relevant members 
of the public to attribute the advertising, merchandising, and the goods they 
encounter in the marketplace as the claimant’s.  They are increasingly 
focussing on how the public would attribute a brand it recognises, rather 
than how the brand recognition is achieved by a trader:  whether through 
sale, endorsement, or merchandising, whether or not through trade within a 
common field, or through advertising alone before trade commences.  The 
law is also recognising that brand promotion and dissemination are not 
necessarily unidirectional - from brand owner to consumers, but rather it 
may be multidirectional – from brand owner to consumers as well as from 
celebrity and peer consumers and endorsers to consumers.  
 
                                                          
128 Fenty [2013] EWHC 2310 at [56]; Fenty [2015] EWCA 3 at [17], [19], [51]. 
129 Fenty [2013] EWHC 2310 at [33], [69]. 
130 Fenty [2013] EWHC 2310 at [74]. 
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This progression is particularly important for cases dealing with 
extraterritorial goodwill because in an age of global electronic 
communication and easy low-cost travel, consumers may gain exposure to 
brands without much regard for jurisdictional boundaries.  Indeed, the 
hypothetical scenario posed in The Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc. 
that a HARRODS trader in a desert would not divert “custom which should go 
to the real Harrods” is increasingly rare.   
 
Nevertheless, the principle derived from this scenario was adopted by the 
Court of Appeal in Anheuser-Busch Inc.  It viewed the presence or absence 
of ordinary trade customers within a jurisdiction as determinative of the 
presence or absence of goodwill there.  It did so notwithstanding the 
preponderance of cases, other than Alain Bernardin et Cie, which have used 
the presence of claimants’ customers within the relevant jurisdiction as part 
of the overall evidence to be considered in the round to support a showing 
of goodwill there.  Mindful of how global electronic communication might 
affect the application of the law, the Court of Appeal in Hotel Cipriani Srl 
nevertheless felt bound by Anheuser-Busch Inc.; the Supreme Court in 
Starbucks (HK) Ltd. felt that legal certainly favoured a requirement of 
customer presence within the jurisdiction.   
 
The Supreme Court applied Lord Oliver’s three-part test from Reckitt and 
Colman Products Limited for the law of passing off – a test applied also to 
cases dealing with false endorsement and merchandising claims (the presale 
advertising cases analysed here predate Reckitt and Colman Products 
Limited).  The formulation of goodwill in Reckitt and Colman Products 
Limited focuses on the association of a claimant’s goods with the claimant’s 
distinctive identifier (such as a trade mark or logo) in the public’s mind such 
that the public would recognise the claimant’s goods by the identifier.131  
The extraterritorial goodwill cases have not justified a variance to the 
formulation.  This conception of goodwill needs to be delineated from its 
evidentiary support, and the finding of goodwill from how goodwill is 
achieved.  The presence of customers who make purchase decisions based 
on their recognition of a claimant’s mark may evidence the presence of 
goodwill within a jurisdiction.  However, the presence or absence of 
customers alone ought not pre-empt the full analysis for the finding of 
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goodwill, much less for the tort as a whole as set out in Reckitt and Colman 
Products Limited.  The test there for establishing goodwill focuses on public 
brand recognition.  It is a robust baseline that straddles the increasingly 
blurred divides among advertising, merchandising, and goods in how they 
attract trade that transcends trade sectors as well as jurisdictional 
boundaries in an age of global electronic communication and easy low-cost 
travel.  
 
